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SCOTT

v.
ILLINOIS

l v SUMMARY:
in £

This petn presents the issue left open

gersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972):

is an indigent

defendant entitled to the assistance of counsel in a criminal
prosecution which, under the criminal statute, might result in
~ctual imprisonment?
I'-

Because Argersinger precludes imprisonment

when counsel was not provided, it may be more accurate to cast
the question in slightly different terms:

Yf ~

does the right to

14(7 ,,,,,,.C/ d, /1,N.t); f'°'~ (.:~.:tt, G/2AIJT.

~

the assistance of counsel extend to prosecutions for

crimes

sufficiently serious that the legislature has made imprisonment
a possible sentence?
~

2. FACTS:
shop-lifting.

Petr was collared by a store security guard for
At the trial before a Chicago circuit court,

the prosecutor presented only one witness, the guard, who
testified that he stopped petr outside the store.

Petr, to

whom nothing had been said regarding the assistance of counsel,
then told his story, which was that he was stopped while still
inside the store and at a time when, with money in hand, he
was looking for a sales person.

The judge then stated to the

prosecutor, "There's a lot of questions I want to know."
prose cu tor responded, "Ask them. "
the m?

The Court: "Why don't you ask .

Are you going to leave it right there?"

"We feel we have made our case."

The

The prosecutor:

The judge thereupon asked

petr a series of questions regarding the incident in order
to clarify pe t r's story.
"I don't believe you, sir.

The judge then stated to petr,
Finding of guilt."

Petr was sen-

tenced to pay a $50 fine.

--

.... v-

The Appellate Court rejected petr's right to counsel argument,
which was made there on both federal constitutional and state
statutory grounds.

In doing so, it proceeded on the assumption

that petr was indigent in fact at the time of the trial.

Although

the record did not show that defendant petitioned for an appointed
trial counsel on the grounds of indigency, the State agreed
with petr that he was an indigent person in the trial court and
,that he had not been advised of a right to the assistance of trial
counsel.

Further, he had established his right to

-3-

appointed appellate counsel because of indigency.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, stating its disinclination
to extend Argersinger ''merely because a defendant is charged with
a statutory offense which provides for various sentencing alternatives upon conviction [including imprisonment]."

Petn, at 3a.

Like the Appellate Court, it assumed that petr was indigent at
the time of his trial.
Justice Goldenhersh dissented, arguing that the right to
the assistance of couns el is so important that "judges should
not engage in nice calculations about when that right should be
enjoyed."

Petn, at Sa.

He also contended that judges do

not have, prior to the trial, the kind of in f ormation necessary
to an intelligent decision regarding sentencing, a decision
required by the narrow reading of Argersinger.
3. CONTENTIONS:
~

Petr relies heavily on Mr. Justice

well's concurrence in Arge rsinger that "It would be illogical
and without discernible support in the Constitution -- to hold
that no discretion may ever be exerci s ed where a nominal jail
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse the
legitimacy of discretion in 'non-jail' petty-offense cases
which may result in far more serious consequences than a few
hours or days of incarceration."

407 U.S., at 25.

Petr also

restates many of the arguments leveled by Mr. Justice Powell
and others at the imprisonment-in-fact standard:

the Fourteenth

Amendment protects both property and liberty; non-jail penalties
'can be more serious, both directly and in their collateral con-

sequences, than

jail

sentences; the judge must determine

without adequate information whether to impose a term of
imprisonment before hearing the case, which frustrates legislative purposes, leads to arbitrary decisions, and denies
defendants of equal protection.

Petr also argues that he

was deprived of a fair trial here because of the lack of
legal assistance.
Petr also contends that there is a circuit split and a
division among the state courts on the question presented here.
He also notes the existence of a split on closely related
questions:

can counselless misdemeanor convictions be used

either for impeachment purposes in subsequent trials of the
defendant or for enhancing the defendant's sentence for subsequent convictions.
4. DISCUSSION:

Most state and federal courts have not

extended Argersinger to those instances where imprisonment
does not in fact result.
F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1976).

~,United States v. White, 529
Petr cites a plethora of cases

supposedly

coming down the other way but all but two of them are opinions
where the holding in Argersinger is casually misstated, or, more
accuaretly, not stated with sufficient precision, and the
misstatement is in no way material to the conclusion of the
court. V'Two courts, however, CA 5 and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, have consciously examined the issue presented here
and ruled that the possibility of imprisonment triggers a right
to the assistance of counsel.

Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450 (5th

Cir. 1976), cert denied, December 12, 1977 (No. 77-503); Thomas
v. Savage, 513 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1975); State ex rel. Winnie v.

Harris, 249 N.W.2d 791 (Wis. 1977).

CA 5 merely continued its

pre-Argersinge r position.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court relied

primarily on the argume nt

that the trial judge, whether proce eding

on an ad hoc basis or the basis of categories of crimes, cannot
sensibly make the imprisonment decision before the case has been

-

tried, as the narrow reading of Argersing e r requires. It thus
agreed with the conclusions in S. Krantz, et al, Right to Coun s el
in Criminal Cases: The Mandate of Argersinger v. Hamlin 69-117
(1976).
In Decembe r 1977, the Court denied cert in Potts, supra, where
the admissibility of prior counselless misdemeanor convictions
for impeachment purposes was raised.

In ~

das a r v. Illinois,

April 14, 1978 Conference, List 2, Sheet 2 (No. 77-6219) (no
respons e ), p e tr asks whether a prior uncounseled mi s demeanor
conviction ma y be used to increase a sentence for a subsequent
misdemeanor offense under an enhanced penalty statute.
I recomme nd a grant in Baldasar, which will permit the
Court to answer the fundamental question rai s ed here regarding
the scope of the right to counsel plus the question of subs e que~t
use of counselless convictions, and a hold for this case.

(This

is assuming that a response in Baldasar and this case will not
demonstrate some independent reason for denying.)

The Court

was understandably concerned in Argersinger with the impact of
the decision, and any wider decision, on the criminal justice
system.

But the courts have lived with Argersinger now for a

sufficiently long time, and sufficient attention has been
focused on the problem of impact, e.g., S. Krantz, supra, that

-u-

the Court can, with some surety, reenter the area to resolve
the conflicts that have arisen.
There is no response.
4/3/78
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-MEMORANDUM ~~,_eflL,cA4-.c.;i__.

~A.f/4-..L~ . . ~~4r._,I~

To:

Mr. Justice Powell # / - ~ , 1 ~ ~

Re:

scott ·v~ · Illinois, No. 77-1177

~ . J - z : . . . . . . . . , ' ~·

~'4SG-~
Scott was arrested and c ~ = _ : ~ =.: ~ft.
charge carried a possible punishm~nt
imprisonment up to one year, or both.

- ~-

~<afin~ to

The

$1 SO or

Petr was indigent at the

time of his trial, and was not advised of a right to the
assistance of counsel: he did not request the appointment of
counsel.

After a bench trial at which Scott was not

represented by counsel, he was convicted and fined $50.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
It refused Scott's invitation to extend Argersinqer ·v~ ·Hamlin,

407 U.S. 25 (1972), to cases in which the defendant might be
but is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment.

The petr begins with the observation that the Sixth
Amendment applies the right to counsel "in all criminal
prosecutions."

He points out that the Sixth Amendment riqht to

counsel has been regarded as an essential element of
fundamental fairness, and has been incorporated into the due
process standard of the Fourteenth Amendment.

--------~~

He contends that

_______________

the States are bound to provide counsel
to indigent defendants
_.,_
in all criminal prosecutions, or at least in every criminal
prosecution where the law authorizes imprisonment.
Either of the rules contended for by petr entails an

k/-,,-_

~
.
0
.::,.,,tjt.~

expansion of the right to counsel beyond the imprisonment-infact standard adopted by the Court in Arger~inge~.

Petr

~~-4......,,

contends that while the Court correctly decided there that the
Sixth Amendment requires at · least that counsel be provided in a
trial resulting in imprisonment, it would be error to conclude
that imprisonment-in-fac~ marks the limit of the Sixth
Amendment requirement.

Many cases which do not result in

imprisonment nonetheless result in serious penalties for the
convicted defendant.

And other Sixth Amendment rights, enjoyed

by a defendant not eligible for counsel under the imprisonmentin-fact standard, cannot be exercised effectively without
assistance of counsel.

Further, the imprisonment-in-fact

standard results in judicial creation of a class of "ultrapetty offenses" in which judqes determine before trial that
regardless of the penalties authorized by the legislature, no
sentences of imprisonment will be imposed.
The petr also argues that due process of law,
considered apart from the particular lanquage of the Sixth
Amendment, requires appointment of counsel in all criminal
prosecutions, or at least in those in which imprisonment is
authorized by law.

Scott contends that without the assistance

of counsel, many defendants will be unable to make skilled
inquiry into the facts or to cope with questions of law that
may arise.
In anticipation of the arqument that society cannot
afford to provide counsel to indigent defendants in all
misdemeanor cases, or in all those with an authorized sentence
of imprisonment, petr argues in effect that society cannot
afford not to provide counsel in such cases.

He bases this

contention partly on the observation that "government has a
paramount interest in assurinq that criminal trials result in
fair determinations of guilt or innocence," and that assistance
of counsel is often necessary to accurate fact-finding.

He

also urges that maintenance of the imprisonment-in-fact
standard, requiring a pre-trial judicial determination of
whether or not a sentence of imprisonment will be imposed upon
conviction, detracts from society's interest in a fair and

accurate criminal justice system.
With regard to the cost of providing the legal
services for which he contends, petr cites two recent studies.

-------·---------

He reports that both studies "concluded that reliable
statistics to support an accurate estimate of this cost do not
exist, that 'the question of calculating the cost of defense
services remains largely an enigma.'"

Br., at 38.

The petr also makes an equal protection argument in
support of his position.

Any rule that limits the right to

counsel of indigent defendants in petty crimes, petr points
out, depends on a classification on the basis of wealth.

Since

the right to counsel is of fundamental importance to a fair
trial, petr concludes, a rule denying counsel to indigents
violates the Equal Protection Clause.
In closing, petr points out several respects in which
he contends that his trial was unfair.

These are set forth at

pp. 62-64 of Petr's Brief, and I will not repeat them here.

The resp relies heavily on Arqersinqer, which it views
as a decision balancing the interest of the defendan~ in
representation by counsel against the burden on the State if it
is required to provide counsel in all criminal prosecutions.
"Faced with the alternatives of allowing an accused to be
deprived of his liberty without counsel or requiring the States

?

to provide counsel for all indigents accused of any criminal
offense, the Court imposed a standard accommodating both the
rights of the accused and the needs of society."

Throughout

its Brief, the State stresses that although the scope of other
Sixth Amendment rights (other than the right to trial by jury)
have never been made to depend upon the seriousness of the

_____

------------------------------------------

offense
charged, none of the other such rights implicate a
,__
"compelling pecuniary interest" of the State.
The State argues that the distinction between the
sanction of imprisonment and all other direct or collateral
consequences of conviction is sufficiently clear and
significant to provide a reasonable boundary for the right to
counsel.

In support of this contention, resp cites Muniz · v~

Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 457 (1975), where the Court held that
the imposition of a $10,000 fine did not require a jury trial.
The Court said, "From the standpoint of determining the
seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible
deprivation faced by a contemnor, imprisonment and fines are
intrinsically different."
The State also argues that indigent misdemeanor
defendants would receive only small benefit from representation
by counsel.

The State argues that procedures in the

misdemeanor courts are informal, that few defendants hire
lawyers, and that often the state is represented not by an
attorney but by the arresting police officer.

It argues that

'·

the right to a jury trial almost always is waived, as it was in
this case, so that there is no need for counsel to direct the
defense in the more complicated setting of a jury trial.
The small benefits to the defendants to be realized
from expansion of the right to counsel, the State urges, cannot
justify the high cost to the State of providing counsel.

It

cites the results of a survey that show tht since Argersinger,
many local courts have stopped incarcerating misdemeanor
defendants because of an inability to provide them with
counsel.
With regard to the pre-trial determination of probable

----

sentencing required by the Argersinger rule, the State contends
that an experienced misdemeanor judge has no difficulty in
making that judgment.

It also argues that the defendant has no

reason to complain of a pre-trial decision that forecloses the
possibility of a sentence of imprisonment.

If the State

decides to tolerate this kind of sentencing decison rather than
pay for counsel for all indigent misdemeanor defendants, then,
according to the State, that decision is of no concern to
either the defendant or this Court.
The State contends that petr's claims based on the
Equal Protection Clause and on the Due Process Clause
considered apart from the Sixth Amendment were not raised in
the state courts or in the petition for certiorari.

Question 2

'in the Petition for Certiorari raised the question whether

7

petr's trial was so unfair as to constitute a violation of due
process.

This claim was not passed on by either of the state

appellate courts.
Petr asserts that the other claims he raises in his
Brief are comprised fairly within Question 1 of the Petition.
"Whether the sixth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States
Constitution quarantee the right to
counsel when a defendant is charqed
with an offense punishable under state
law by imprisonment, regardless of
whether the defendant is in fact
imprisoned?"
The equal protection claim does rest on the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

But that claim is not

mentioned in either of the state court opinions in this case or
in the Petition for Certiorari.

The same is true of petr's

argument that even if the Sixth Amendment does not require
counsel for all indigent misdemeanor defendants, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does.

My reading of

the opinions below and the petition in this Court indicates to
me that this case has been treated throughout as presenting the
Sixth Amendment question left open in Arqe~singer, and I think
it should continue to be treated on that narrow basis.
Discussion:
You set out your views in this area in your concurrin~
opinion in Arqersinger, a copy of which is attached to this
'memorandum.

Assuming that the Court will not now reexamine the
~rqersinger holding and adopt your suggested due process
approach to the provision of counsel in all petty or
misdemeanor cases, I expect that it will tend towards some
bright-line boundary for the right to counsel in such cases.

(7)

~
~

~fA

l

One possibility is to adopt the imprisonment-in-fact standard
of Argersinger as the limit of the due process right to
counsel.

standard of possibility-of-

imprisonment, and a third is to settle o ~

-·~;

rule requiring

sel for all misdemeanor defendants.

~:~
~

Another is to adop ~

There is little practical difference between the
econd and third suggestions, since most petty or misdemeanor

-----~

crimes carry the possibility of some imprisonment.

This

~ ~ probably explains why the petr is never careful in his Brief to
~v

specify which of the two rules he prefers.

(The "Question

ty
Presented" in the Petition for Certiorari does opt for the
possibility-of-imprisonment standard; seep. 7 supra.)

-

The

difficulty with either of petr's suggestions is obvious -- the
States must shoulder considerable additional burdens in order
to enforce their laws, when in many cases the demands of fair
and accurate fact-finding and application of the law may be
satisfied without providing counsel.

The difficulties with

the first alternative, adopting the Argersinger rule as the
limit of due process requirements, are stated in your

'--

concurring opinion in that case.

]
The Argersinger chickens have come home to roost.

/~'
The

majority opinion in that case refers to the Sixth Amendment
standards for "all criminal prosecutions" in defining the
requirements of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

If

the language of the Sixth Amendment, and its history, compel
the conclusion that counsel is required at least in "all
criminal prosecutions" resulting in imprisonment, it is
difficult to see any reasoned distinction that will limit the
requirement at the point of imprisonment.

Only the right to

jury trial has been limited in a similar way, and that
limitation rests explicitly on the peculiar history of the jury
trial right.
As a matter of practical statemanship, however, it
would still be preferable to apply the due process rule of
fairness that you suggested in Arg~rsiq~~r to misdemeanor or
petty crime prosecutions not resulting in imprisonment.
~~~"-'K...t)~

think it would be worth swallowing the logical difficulty of
distinguishing imprisonment from other consequences of such
prosecutions in order to avoid further extension of
mandatory provision of counsel.
In my view, the most difficult result to justify would
be a holding that imprisonment-in-fact defines the limit of the
due process right to counsel in criminal prosecutions.

For all

of the reasons stated in your concurring opinion in
Argersinger, it seems clear that there will be at least some

misdemeanor cases in which no imprisonment results, but in
which the interests at stake and the complexity of the issues
create a need for assistance of counsel.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffi
No. 77-1177
Aubrey Scott, Petitioner,

v.
State of Illinois.

lo

W.
C .
.
h S .
n nt of ert10ra.n to t e upreme Court of Illinois.
/;,~

[January -, 1979]

{:_

M

/ //
/ ·

'f

~~..e-,__
~~

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIS'l' delivered the opinion of the
Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a conflict
among state and lower federal courts regarding the proper
application of our decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 ( 1972) .1 Petitioner Scott was convicted of theft and fined
$50 after a bench trial in the Circuit Court ofc5ook County,
Ill. His conviction was affirmed by the state intermediate
appellate court and then by the Supreme Court of Illinois,
over Scott's contention that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution required that Illinois
provide trial counsel to him at its expense.
Petitioner Scott was convicted of shoplifting merchandise
valued at less than $150. The applicable Illinois statute sets
the maximum peualty for such an offense at a $500 fine or one
~-:--:----=-7--~-;:--~ --.,.-:-:-....-------:-;--:---;- year in jail, or ooth. 2
e petitioner argues that a line of

-

-------

--

' Compare, e. g .. Potts v. Estelle, 529 F. 2d 450 (CA5 1976); In re
Di Bella, 518 .F . 2d 955 (CA2 1975); State ex rel, Winnie v. Harris , 75
Wis. 2d 547, 249 N. W. 2d 791 (1977), with United States v. White. 529
F. 2d 1390 (CA8 1976) ; Sweeten ,·. Sneddon, 463 F. 2d 713 (CAIO 1972):
Ro//111~ v. Stat/', 299 So. 2d 5X6 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, -H9 U.S. 1000
(1974) .
i Ill . Ht•v. 8tat. 1969, ch. :38, par. 16-1.
The penalty provh,ion of the
~tatutr provides in relevant part:
''A prrson first convicted of theft of property not from the pen;on and
not Pxceeding $150 in value ;;hall be fined not to exceed $500 or impri::,oned

I
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th is Court's cases culminating in Argermnger v. Hamlin, supra,
1 equirc Statl' provisio11 of counsel whenever imprisonment-is
an authorized penalty.
The Supreme Court of Illinois rejected this contention,
quoting the followi11g language· from Argersinger:
"We hold , therefore, that absent a kno~iug and intelligent waiver. no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
fr]ony. unless he was represented by counsel at ·his
trial. " 407 F . S., at 37.
" Under the rule we announce today, every judge will
know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no
impriso11rnrnt may he imposed, even though local law
permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel.
He will hav<' a measure of the seriousness and gravity of
the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer
to represent the accused before the trial startsl Id., at 40. /
1

~----

::,_,_..

The Supreme Court of Tllinois went on to state that it was
" not inclined to rxteud Argersinger" to the. case where a
defendant is charged with a statutory offense for which
imprisomn('nt upon conviction is authorized but not actually
imposed upon the defendant. 68 Ill. 2d 269, 272, 369 N. E.
2d 881, 882 ( 1977). ·wP agree with the Supreme Court of
Illinois that the Federal Constitution does not require a trial
court to a p p o ~ ~ f e u d a n t such as
p c ~ , and we therefore affinn its judgment.
fo his petitiou for certiorari, petitioner referred to the issue
in this casr as "the question left open in Argersinger v. Hamli11, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)." Petition, at 5. Whether this question was inderd "left open" in A rgersinger depends upon
in a pPnal inHtitulion olhrr tlrnu thr penif{'ntia.ry 110[ to rxrrrcl one rrar,
or both. A p('J':-;on ronv1r·t<·d or ~,H'h theft a ~reo11d or suh~rquent fime, or
arter a prior eo11vic-tio11 or an~· type of theft , ,;hall be impri~oncd i11 the·
pmi!r11tian· from on<· lo /5 yc,1r~. . "

11 /_/J IL J!./J
~ - 7.
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whether one considers that opinion to be a point in a moving
line or a holding that the States are required to go only so far
in furnishing counsel to indige11t defendants. The Supreme
Court of Illinois, in quoting the above language from Argersinger, clearly viewed the latter as A...I.Jlersinger's holding.
Additional support for this proposition may be derived from
the cone] udill · aragraph of the opillion in that case:
" The run of misdemeano·t s will not be affected by today's
ruliug. But in those that en<l up in the actual <leprivatio11 of a person's liberty, the accused will receive the benefH of 'the guiding halld of counsel' so necessary where
oue's Jibe1 ty is in .ieopatdy." 407 U. S., at 40.
1

Petitioner, on the other hand, refers to language in the
Court's opinion, responding to the opinion of MR. Jus'l'ICE
/ Pow8LL, which states that the Court "11ee<l not consider the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right to
counsel where loss of liberty is not involved . .. for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to jail.'' Id., at 37.
There is considerable doubt that the Sixth Amendment
its<'lf, as originally <ltafted by the Framers of the Bill of
Rights, contemplatec-1 any guat'antee other than the right of
an accused in a criminal prosecutiou to employ a lawyer to
assist in his defense. \V. Beaney, "rhe Right to Counsel in
Amencan Courts 27-30 (1955). ln PowelZ v. Alabama, 287
U s. 45 (1932). the Court held that Alabama was obligated
to appoint counsel for the Rcottsboro defendants. phrasing the
inqmry as " whether the defendants were in substance deuiecl
tlw right of counsel, and if so. whether such denial infringes
the Due P,:gcess Clause of the Fourteenth Ame11dmeut." Id.,
at 52 It concluded its opinion with the following language:
" The -C11ited 8tates by statute and every state in the
Union by express provision of law, or by the <leterminaUon of its courts, make it the duty of the trial judge,
wlwre the accused 1s unable to employ counsel, to appoint

,,
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counsel for him. In most states the rule applies broadly
to all criminal prosecutions, in others it is limited to the
more serious crimes, and in a very limited number. to
capital cases. A rule adopted with such unanimous
accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inhere11t right
to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like the
present, alld lends convincing support to the conclusion
we have reached as to the fundamental nature of that
--=-=--l'ight." 287 U. S., at 73.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), held that not every
indigent ctefenaant accused in a state criminal prosecution was
entitled to appointment of counsel. A determina.tion had to )
be made in each i11Clividual case whether failure to appoint
counsel was a denial of fundamental fairness. Betts was in
turn overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
In Gideon, Betts was described as holding "that a refusal to
appoint counsel for a.11 indigent defendant charged with a
t:clm,ly did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment... ." Id., at 339.
Several Terms later the Court held in Duncan v. Louisiaria,
391 U. S. 145 (1968), that the right to ~jury inal in federal
court guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was applicable to
the States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Court held, however, that "[i]t is doubtless true that there
is a category of petty crimes or offenses which is not subject
to the Sixth Amendment jury trial provision and should not
be subject to the Fourteenth Amendment jury trial requirement here applied to the States. Crimes carrying possible
penalties up to six months do not require a "jury trial if they
ot erwise qua 1 y as petty offenses . . . .
Id., at 159 (footnote orn1 e ) . In Bal win v. N f!,W York, 399 U. S. 66, 69
( HJ70), the co11trolling opinion of MR. JusTICE WHITE concluded that "no offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of
the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than·
::,ix months is authorize<l."

----

'·
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In Aryersinyer the State of Florida urged that a similar
dichotomy be employed in the right-to-counsel area: any
offense puuishable by less than six months iu jail should 11ot
require appointment of counsel for an iudigent defendant. 3
The Aryersinyer Court rejected this analogy, however. observing that "the right to trial by jury has a different genealogy
alld is brigaded with a system of trial to a judge aloue." 407
U. S., at 29.
The number of separate opinions in Gideon, supra, Duncan,
supra, Baldw-i11, supra, anrl Aryersinyer, supra, suggests that
constitutional I Jline drawi11 ' ' becomes more difficult as the reach
of the Constitution is extended furt er, and as efforts are
made to t™IBJ)Ose 1-:n;-f~m one ~ea of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence to another, The process of \h-corporatio1~
creates special difficulties. for the state a11d federal contexts
are often different and application of the same principle may
have ramifications distinct in degree and kind. The range of
humau conduct regulated by state criminal laws is much
broader than that of the federal criminal laws, particularly 011
the "petty" offense part of the spectrum. As a matter of
coustitutional adjudication, we are, therefore, less willing to
1
extrapolate ~]1 alrea<t:'._ extended line' when, although the general nature of the principle sought to be applied is clear. its
precise limits and their ramifications become less so. We
have now in our decided cases forsaken the literal rneanin of
the Sixth Amendment. And we cannot a ack on the comm"on law as it existed prior to the enactment of that Amendment, since it perversely gave less ill the way of right to counsel to accused felons than to those accused of misdemeanors.
See Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 60.
In Argersinyer the Court rejected arguments that social
cost or a lack of available lawyers militated against its holdrng, in some part because it thought these arguments were
factually incorrect. 407 U. 8., at 37 n. 7. But they were
3

Brief of He;;pondent, a1 12, Aroersinyer v. Hamlin , 407 ll. S. 25 {1972).
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rejected in much larger part because of the Court's conclusion
that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not
be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent
defendant hat! been offered appointed counsel to assist in his
defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in such
a rule. The Court in its opinion repeatedly referred to trials
"where an accused is deprived of his liberty," 407 U. S., at 32,
and to "a case that actually leads to imprisonment even for a
brief period," 407 U. S.. at 33. THE CHIEF JUSTICE in his
opimon concurring in the result also observed that "l!:Y
de )nvation of libert is a serious matter." 407 U. S., at 41.
Although the intentions of the rgersinger Court are not
unmistakably clear from its opinion, we conclude toda hat
Argersinger did indeed delimit the Six
Amendment right
to appomtea counsel in state criminal proceedings. 1 Even
weretlie matter res nova, we believe that the central premise
of Aryersinger-that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonmentis emmeutly sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the liue defining the constitutional right to appointment of couusel. Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas auy extens10n would create confusion a1rd
1~ose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on
50 qmte diverse States." We therefore hold that the Sixth
WP note that the hne drawn in Argersiuger wa;; with full awareness of
th<' vanom; opt10ns. BoTh tlie petitioner in that case and the Legal Aid
Society of New York, as arnicus curiae, argu<'d that the right to ap11oiutecl
counsf'l sho11lcl JJertain in any case in which imJJri8onment was an author1zrd penalty for the underlying offf'llS<'. Brief for the Petitioner, at 4;
Bnef of the Legal Aid Society of Nf'w York as Amicus Curiae, at 5-11.
lfrspondent Florida and the arnici Statf's urged that the line be drawn as
11 had been m Baldwin for purpose::; of the jury trial guarantee. See, e. y.,
Brwf of Hf'sponc!C'nt, at U. Tlw Solir1tor General argued for the :standard that was finally adopted-that of actual imprisonmf'nt. Brief for the
United States a,; Amicus Curiae, at 22-24.
5 UufortnnatC'ly, C'xte11s1ve empmral work ha:-; not ber,;n donf'.
That
wl11ch C'xist,; ;;ngg<'st,; that the rf'quirements of Argersinger have not provc<l
1
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and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu;,
t10n require only that any indigent criminal defendant who is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment have been afforded the
right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. The
Judgment of the Supreme Court of Illi11ois is accordingly
Affirmed.

1o be unduly bmden~ome. Soe, e. y., Ingraham, The Impact of Arger·s
;;UlfJer-One Year Later, 8 Law & Society Rev. 615 (1974). That somEj
,p1n~d1ctionR have had difficulty implementing Argersiuyer is crrtainly not

nn argumr11t for rxtendmg 1t . S. Krantz et al., Right to Coqrn;el jq
(.'nn1inal C'a~r:s 1- JX (1!l7fi) ,

f I
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
I am not able to join the opinion of the Court for
the reasons stated fully in my concurring opinion in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, --- (1972).

Petitioner

here was convicted of shoplifting, and the only penalty
imposed was a $50 fine.

The applicable Illinois statute

provided a maximum penalty of a $500 fine or one year in
jail, or both.

Petitioner argues that counsel must be

provided an indigent defendant whenever imprisonment is an

.
.

~

authorized penalty.

The Court rejects that argument,

holding that Argersinger requires counsel only when there is
an actual deprivation of a person's liberty.
The Court's opinion, with commendable candor,
recognizes that it is "line-drawing", that the line "already
[is] extended", and that "our decided cases [have] forsaken
the literal meaning of the Sixth Amendment".

Ante at 5.

If the forsaking of the Sixth Amendment can be
forgiven, I would have thought that recourse would have been
to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and its concept of fundamental fairness.

To be

sure, a drawn line - if bright enough - is thought to have
the merit of uniformity and ease of application.

For the

.

,.

2.

reasons set forth in my opinion in Argersinqer, its "line"
results neither in uniformity nor is it invariably easy to
apply.

Most misdemeanor or petty crime statutes provide, as

does the Illinois statute at issue here, for a jail sentence
or a fine or both, the sentence to vary according to the
severity and circumstances of the offense, including the
record of the offender.

The penalty provisions of such

statutes are intended to afford flexibility in sentencing,

,,

according discretion in this respect to the sentencing
authority.
The Argersinger line inevitably frustrates this
salutory purpose in a high percentage of cases.

It requires

.

'

the presiding judge to determine in advance of hearing any
evidence, or indeed in advance of knowing anything about the
case or the defendant except the charge, to make one of the
more critical decisions:

whether he will forego the

legislatively granted option to impose a jail sentence for
even so much as a single day.

Unless the presiding judge

foregoes this option, he must appoint counsel if indigency
is claimed - as it often is.

The Court's opinion states, in

the absence of "extensive empirical" documentation, that
"Argersinger has proved reasonably workable".

Ante at

Perhaps this is true if the Court simply means that judges
can follow the Argersinger rule.

It is quite simple -

invitingly simple - for a judge to forego the responsibility

-'

,- .
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imposed on him by the legislature to consider whether the
evidence adduced at trial and the record of the defendant
warrants a jail sentence.

Moreover, the decision not to

exercise the prescribed sentencing discretion often is
forced upon the judge by circumstances.

In the busy

metropolitan misdemeanor court, where dockets are
overcrowded and delay already is intolerable, the
appointment of counsel is likely to exacerbate these
problems.

In counties and small towns, remote from

metropolitan bars, counsel may be wholly unavailable.

It is

predictable in these situations that all too often the
pressure to take the easy Arqersinqer course of deciding in
advance the character of the punishment, will be too great
to resist.
Quite apart from this de facto nullification of
a large element of the sentencing discretion authorized by
the legislature, the effect on the criminal justice system
is unlikely to be in the public interest.

It is not

unreasonable to suppose that the deterrence factor of the
criminal law is weakened.

There will be fewer jail

sentences imposed for petty crimes, and the imposition of a
fine upon an indigent is likely to be no penalty at all.
The other side of the coin, addressed in my
Argersinger concurring opinion, is that no counsel need be
provided for petty offenses where conviction may be more

',
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serious than a brief incarceration.

The case that comes at

once to mind is the revocation of one's driver's license
where driving may be indispensable to livelihood.

There may

be many other situations where conviction of an offense, not
carrying a jail sentence, is more l

deprivation than a night

in jail.
In sum, the Argersinger line-drawing often will
lack the element of fairness when applied to defendants; and
in other situations seems likely to disserve the oublic
interest in the detering of petty crime.

In a more

fundamental sense, it is grounded in no constitutional
provision.

The Court concedes that the Sixth Amendment's

literal meaning has been "foresaken".

In my view, the very

·• ' .

concept of fundamental fairness as a due process doctrine
4-tf?-...-D

applicable to each trial is foresaken by inflexible line-'\

drawing.

In my Argersinger concurrence, supra, at

, I

outlined the principles that should guide a Court's decision
in determining whether and when duep process requires the
appointment of counsel.

I adhere to the views there

expressed.
•:-i,·
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JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
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77-1177 - Scott v. Illinois

Dear Bill,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference ,
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CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
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January 15, 1979

Re:

No. 77-1177 - Scott v. Illinois

Dear Bill:
Subject to our telephone conversation, I
am glad to join your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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Dear Bill:

Althouqh I probably wilJ concur in th
will write something in this case.

judgment, I

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist
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)Ir. Justice Rehnquist
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Ir. Justice Powell

Ciroulated:

1st Dlt.Aff

I

Reciroulated : _ _ _ _ ___,._

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATF.8
No. 77-1177
Aubrey Rcott, Petitioner,

v.

Rtat(' of Illinois.

I

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Jllinois.

rFebruary - , rn7D]
Mn.

Jn,TJCE

JAN 1979_

Powr:LL, concurring in the judgment.

The petitioner was tried for shopliftiug under ai1 lllinois
statute providing for a maximum penalty of a. $500 fine or one
year iu jail. or both. After waiving his right to a jury trial,
the petitiouer was convicted and fined $50. The Court rejects
the petitioner's argument that as all indigent. he should
have been provided with counsel because imprisonment was
an authorized prnalty for the crime with which he was
charged . Relying 011 Argersi11ger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25
(1972). the Court holds instead that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Ame11dments require the States to provide counsel only to
i11digents who are sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Although 1 concur in the affirmancr of the petitio11er's conviction. T am U11able to join the opinion of the Court. Reo
id., at 44 ( PowELL. J.. concurring).
The Court's opinion. with commendable candor. states that
" our decided cases [have] forsaken the literal mea.n ing of the
Sixth Amendment.' ' Ante, at 5. This acknowledgement is
highlighted by the absence of historical or precedential justification for the line the Court draws to limit the "already extendrd " reach of the Sixth Ameudrnent. Ibid. As the Sixth
A11w11dme11t provides no guidance in this area. the Court
should l'<'CUr to tlw Du<' Process Clause. which in its basic con- ·
ccpt of fairness gives full recog11ition to the constitutional
interests of criminal defendants. Instead, the Court finds in
th<· Sixth Amrndrnent a catRgorical diff('rence between inJi...

.- .
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ge11t state misdemeanor defendants who are sentenced to
imprisonment alld those who are not, and concludes that the
Constitution guarantees only the former group the right to
assistance of appointed counsel.
The rule adopted by the Court in this case and in Argersinger is easy to apply, in the sense that a sta.te court can have
to doubt as to this prerequisite for an imposition of a sentence
of imprisonment. For the reasons set forth in my opinion in
Argersiuger, however, 1 adhere to my view that the Court's
rule imposes burdens on both defendants and the public that
are too severe to be justified by the apparent simplicity of the
rule.
Some defenda11ts may be affected more seriously by the
payment of a fiue, the loss of a driver's license, or the impact
of the stigma attached to a conviction, than by a, brief incarceration. Yet no matter how serious the nonirnprisonment
consequences of conviction, there is 110 right to counsel under
the Court's rule unless a sentence of imprisonment also is imposed. Similarly, defendants who do not have a right to
counsel under the Court's rule may be faced by legal or factual
questions as complex as those raised by the charges against
defendants who are sentenced to prison. The lack of counsel
may be especially unfair where a defendaut who is not afforded counsel under the Court's rule exercises a right to trial
by jury, for "before a jury the guiding haud of counsel is
needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case 011 behalf of the defendant." Id., at
40 (POWELL, J., concurring).
The Court's rule, in addition to denying assistance of counsel unfairly in some cases, also impairs the functioning of
the criminal justice system. Most misdemeanor and petty
crime statutes provide for imprisonment, a fine, or both. The
penalty provisions of such statutes are intended to afford the
judge considerable flexibility in fitting the sentence to the
eir-cumsta11ces and sevf)rity of the offense and to the record of

.'
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the offender. The "bright line" adopted by the Court in this
case and Aryersinger inevitably frustrates this important purpose. The trial judge, in advance of hearing any evidence,
indeed, in advance of knowing anything about the case except
the charge, must decide whether he will forego the legislatively granted authority to impose a senteHce of imprisonment
upon conviction. Unless the judge surrenders this option, he
must appoint comisel to assist the indigent defendant. Thus,
the Court's rule forces the trial judge to make an importa.nt
prelirninary sentencing decision without the knowledge on
which such decisions should be based.
Moreover, given the practical realities of the rnisdemeauor
and petty offensr trial courts in the States, 011e can forsee
readily the direction in which the Argersinger rule will distort
the penaltiPs imposed. In busy metropolitall courts, where
dockets are overcrowded and delay a.lready is intolerable, trial
judges are likely to dispeuse with the option of imprisonment
rather than further delay proceedings to secure counsel for an
indigent defendant. In rural counties and small towus. remote from metropolitan bars and often strapped for funds,
counsel may be wholly unavailable or else beyond the financial
means of the local government. As a result, iu many cases
i11 which due process would not require assistauce of counsel,
the trial judge will be pressured nonetheless to foreclose the·
option of a senteuce of imprisonment.*
Quite apart from the irrationalities and distortions intro-·
duced into the sentencing decisions of state trial judges, the
Court's rule has a serious impact on another important public
interest. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the deterrent effect of the misdemeanor and petty offense laws is
weakened by a systematic reduction in the number of jail
sentences irnposed. The Court's rule will also make the en-;eSfP ~ational L<:'gal Aid and Defender A,-"n ., ThP Othf'r FRC'f' of
,)u,-lirf' :{8-40, 6;{-(i4 (197;{) ; d1·u.er8ingPr, supra, at 55-(il (Pow1,:LL, J .,
ro11r111:ring) .
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forcement of fines against recalcitrant defendants difficult, if
not impossible, as it seems unlikely that the Court contem- '
plates the circumvention of its rule by the jailing of uncounseled indigents for failure to pay such fines. Id., at 55
(POWELL, J., concurring).
In sum, the Argersinger line often will result in unfairness
to defendants, and in many other situations seems likely to
disserve the public interest in a rational and effective system
of criminal justice. These flaws are but indications of the
lack of any constitutional basis for the Court's categorical rule.
In my view, the very concept of fairness as a due process doctrine applicable to each trial precludes such inflexible linedrawing. Rather, in each case the trial judge should decide
whether fairness requires appointment of counsel after considering the complexity of the offense charged, the severity of
the sentence that might follow conviction, and other factors
peculiar to each case. In my opinion in Argersiriger, I re- 1
viewed this inquiry, and the demands that it would place on
state trial judges. Id., at 64-65 (PowEt.L, J., concurring).
Here, the petitioner waived a jury trial on a simple charge
of shoplifting several items valued at $13.68. The prosecutor made no opening or closing statement, did not object
to any testimony offered by the petitioner, declined the
court's invitation to cross-examine the petitioner, and called
no rebuttal witnesses. The trial court, in contrast, took an
active role in questioning the petitioner about the facts surrounding his arrest. Since there was no unfairness in trying
the petitioner without affording him the assistance of counsel,
I join in the judgment affirming his conviction.

;

To: The C'lle.f Justice
Mr. Justice S+Pwart
Mr. Justice White
M... Ju.,t•ce U1.rsli.1.ll
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Hr. Juc;tico PJ rell
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On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
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Mn.

JusTICl!J BRENNAN,

dissenting.

The Sixth Amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
assistance of Counsel for his defense." (Emphasis supplied.)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 tr. S. 335 (1963), extended the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment and held that the right includes the
right of the indigent to have counsel provided. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that the right recognized in
Gideon extends to the trial of any offense for which a convicted defendant is likely to be incarcerated.
This case presents the question whether the right to counsel
extends to a person accused of an offense that, although
punishable by incarceration, is actually punished only by a
fine. Petitioner Aubrey Scott was charged with theft in
violation of Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 16-1 (A)(l) (1972), an
offense punishable by imprisonment up to one year or by a
fine up to $500, or by both. About four months before
Argersinger was decided, Scott had a bench trial, without
counsel, and without uotice of entitlement to retain counsel or, if in<ligent,1 to have counsel provided. He was found
guilty as charged and sentenced to pay a $50 fine.
1
Scott wm, found to ix, indigent at the time of his initial appeal, and an
uttorncy was therefore appointed for !um and he was provided a free
tran~c:npl of his trial for use on the appeal. The Illin01s eourt:,; and the
p11rti<·~ hnve a:,;,,mned lm; indigeney at thP timP of trinl for purposes of this
case Rec AppP11dix to Pet. for Cert.., at la-2a, lOa-1 la.

.•
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The Court, in an opinion that at best ignores the basic
principles of prior decisions, affirms Scott's conviction without
counsel because he was sentenced only to pay a fine. In my
view, the plai11 wording of the Sixth Amendment and the
Court's precedents compel the conclusion that Scott's uncounseled conviction violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend ..
ments and should be reversed.

I
Both the Court's opinion and the concurrence intimate a
view that the Court's precedents ordaining the right to ap ..
pointed counsel for indigent accuseds in state criminal pro ..
ceedings fail to provide a principled basis for deciding this
case. That is demonstrably not so. The principles developed
in the relevant precedents are clear and sound. The Court
simply chooses to ignore them.
Gideon v. Wainwright held that, because representation by
counsel in a criminal proceeding is "a fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial.'' 372 U. S., at 342, the Sixth Ame11d . .
ment right to counsel was applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment :
"[R] easou and reflectioll require us to recognize that in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments,
both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused
of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly
society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged
with crime. few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers
they can get to prepare and present their defenses. · That
government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the
strongest indicatioJJ.s of the widespread belief that lawyer::i

'
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in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right
of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries,
but it is in ours. From. the very beginning. our state
an<l national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed
to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which
every <lefenclant stauds equal before the law. This noble
ideal cannot be realized if the poor mau charged with
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist
him ." Id., at 344.
Earlier precedents had recoguized that the assistance of
appointed counsel was critical. not only to equalize the sides
in an a<lversary criminal process, 2 but also to give substance to other constitut10nal and procedural protections
afforded criminal defendants. 3 Gideon established the right
2 " !Tim Sixth AmPndmrntl rmhodir;, a rcalistir rc<"ognition of the
obvion,; imth that the averagf:' defrudant does not havr the professional
lrgal Hkill to protect him:;elf whrn brought, brforr a tribunal with power
to take his lifr or libcrt~,, wherein thr prosecution is l rr ]prrsPnted by
expnieneed and IParned roun,-el. That. whirh i~ ~implr, orderly and
neces~a~· to the lawyer, to thr nntrninrd la~·1n.m mar appear intricate,
complex and mysteriou1, ." Joh11so11 v. Zerb~t, 304 U. S. -!58, -!62--16:~
(19:38) .
8 "The right to 1X' heard would be, in many case , of little avail if it did
not comprPhPnd tlw right. to be !ward b~· counsel. Even thr intPlligent
and Pducat<'d layman ha:,: small and sometimr~ no ;;kill in the science of
law. If charged with crime, hr i:,; ineapalilr., generall.,·. of determining for
himHelf whrtl1rr the indictmPnt i:,; good or bnd. He is unfamiliar with the
mle,; of rvidrnrr. LPft without the aid of <·ounsrl hr ma~· be put on trial
w1t.hont. a propn rharge, and convirtr<l upon incomf)('tent rvidrneP, or
cviden<"<' irrrlevant 10 the is:;ue or othrrwt:-«' inadmissible. He la~b both
thl-' ~kill and knowlrdge adPquatrl~· to pr<'pare hi~ drfern;e, ewn though
he haYf' a Jl<'rfpct one. Hr rN.Jmrrs tlw guiding hand of coun~PI Ht every
step m thr proePedmgs again~t him. Without it, though hr be not guilty,
he faer:; the dang<'r of conv1ction lWl':\U~<' lw do<',.; not know how to
establish !mi innorrncc. If thnt hr trnc ol 111<·11 of mtelligence, how much
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to appointed counsel for indigent accuseds as a categorical
requirement, making the Court's former case-by-case clueprocess analysis, cf. Betts ,,. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 ( 1942),
unnecessary in cases covered by its holding. Gideon involved
a felony prosecution, but that fact was not crucial to the decision; its reasoning extended. in the words of the Sixth Amendment. to "all criminal prosecutions." 1
Argersinger v. Hamlin took a cautious approach toward
implementing the logical consequences of Gideon's rationale.
The petitioner in Argersinger had bee11 sentenced to jail for
90 days after conviction-at a trial without cousel-of carrying a concealed weapon, a Florida offense carrying an authorized penalty of imprisonment up to six months and a fine up·
to $1.000. The State, relying on Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U. S. 145 (1968), and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66
(1970), urged that the Sixth Amendment right to couusel, like
the right to fury trial. should not apply to accuseds charged'
with "petty" offenses punishable by less than six months
imprisonment. But Argersinr1er refused to extend the "petty"
offensp limitatio11 to thP right to counsel. The Court pointed
out tha.t the limitation was contrary to the express words of
the Sixth Amendment. which gvarantee its enumerated rights
"li]n all criminal prosecutions"; that the right to jury trial
was the only Sixth Amendment right applicable to the States
that had bee11 held inapplicable to "petty offenses"; " that this
more trne is it of the ignorant am! illiterate, or tho~e of feeble intellect."·
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 4.'i, o8-6H (1932).
4 Ser Aryer8inger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, ;31 (1H72).
r. "It, is ~imp[~, uot arguable, nor ha::l any court ever held, that the trial
of a petty offense may bP held in secrPt, or without notice to thr accused
of t.he charges, or that m ~uch case~ tlw defpndant has no right to
confront his accusrr,; or to comprl the attendance of w1tne,;~es in hi::l own
of'half." Aryerswyer v. Harn/in. 407 l'. S. :25, :28 (1972), quotmg ,Jun hr,
The lhght to CounKf'l m Mi:;uf'mrauor Case~, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 705
(Hl68) . Cf. In re Oliver, 3;33 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial);
Pointer v Texas, 380
S 400 (1965) (right to coufi;ont_ation) ,;

r:.
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limitation had been based on historical considerations peculiar to the right to jury trial; 0 and that the right to counsel
was more fundamentally related to the fairness of criminal
prosecutions than the right to jury trial and was in fact essential to the meaningful exercise of other Sixth Amendment
protections. 1
Although its analysis, like that in Gideon and other earlier·
cases, suggested that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
should apply to all state criminal prosecutions, Argersinger
held only that an indigent defendant is entitled to appointed
counsel, even in petty offenses punishable by six months of
inca.rceration or less, if he is likely to be sentenced to incarceration for any time if convicted. The question of the right
to counsel in cases in which incarceration was authorized but
woulcI not be imposed was expressly reserved. 8
Wmihington v. Texas, 388 11 . S. 14 (1967) (right to compubory procC'ss of
witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U. S. 213 (1967) (right to a
speedy trial); Groppi v. Wisconsin. 400 U. S. 505 (1971) (right to an
impartial jury): Henderson v. Moroan. 426 ll . S. ti37 (1976) (right to be
mformed of the nature and causC' of the accmmtion).
0 " While there is historical i:;11pport for limiting the 'deE'p commitment'"
to trial by jury to 'r;erious criminal <'a1<es,'· there is no imch support for a·
similar limitation on the right to a::;::;ista.nce of counsel . . .
"The Sixth Amendment . . . extended the right to counsel beyond its·
'Common-law dimensions. But there b nothing in the language of theAmendment, its history, or in the decisions of thi:; Court, to indicate that
it was intended to embody a retraction of the right in pett.v offenses
wherein the common law previous!)· did require that counsel be provided."'
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 30 (footnote and citations omitted).
7 Id., at 31; see text and note, at n. 3, supra.
~ "MH. JusnCJ,J POWELL ~ugge8tS that tlwse problems f requiring the·
pre,-,enro of ro11nsel to msure tlw arrused' a. fair trial] are rai~ed even ins1t 11ation1< whrrP thl're is no pro~pr<'t of imprisonment. . . . We need not,
romnder tlw rr4uirrments of the Sixth Amrndineut as regard:; the r:ght to·
co11 nsel where lo~s of lilwrt~· b 1101 involved, howr,·er, for· lien• petitionei:·
wa:-1 m fa<:t sentenC('(:I to J.a1I. '' 407 [T , S., at W7.:

',
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II
In my view petitioner could prevail in this case without.e.xtending the right to counsel beyond what was assuu;ied to
exist in Argersinger. Neither party in that case questioned
the existence of the right to counsel in trials involving "nonpetty" offenses punishable by more than six months i11 jail. 0
The question the Court addressed was whether the right
applied to some "petty" offenses to which the right to jury
trial did not extend. The Court's reasoning in applying the
right to counsel in the case before it-that the right to counsel
is more fundamental to a fair proceeding than the right to
jury trial and that the historical limita,tions on the jury-trial
right are irrelevant to the right to cou11sel-certainly cannot
support a standard for the right to counsel that is more restrictive than the standard for granting a right to jury trial. As
my Brother POWELL commented in his concurring opi11io11 in
Argersinger, 407 U. S .. at 45-46. "It is clear that wherever the
right-to-counsel line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that
an indigent has a right to appointed counsel in all cases -in
which there is a due process right to a jury trial." Argersinger
thus established a. "two dimensional" test for the right tocounsel: the right attaches to any "non-petty" offense punishable by more than six months in jail and in addition to any
offense where actual incarceration is likely regardless of the
maximum authorized pe11alty. See Duke, The Right to,
Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 Am. Crim. I;,.
Rev. 601 (1975) .
The offense of "theft" with which Scott was charged is certainly not a "petty" one. If is puriishable by a sentence of
up to one year in jail. Unlike many traffic or other "regulatory" offenses, it carries the moral stigma associated with common-law crimes traditionally recognized as indicative of moral

'.

.,•'
,,

I

9 See, e. g., Argersinger v. Hamlin , 407 U. S., at 27, 330-331, 36, and:
n. 5; ill., at, 45, and n. 2, 63 (PowgLL , ,r., concurring) ..

j
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depravity. 10 The State indicated at ora.1 argument that the
services of a professional prosecutor were considered essential
to the prosecution of this offense. Tr. of Oral Arg., at 39; cf.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, 407 U. S., at 49 (PowELL, J.,
concurring). Likewise, nonindigent defendants charged with
this offense would be well advised to hire the "best lawyers
they can get." 11 Scott's right to the assistance of appointed
counsel is thus plainly mandated by the logic of the Court's
prior cases, including Argersinger itself .12
10

Because a theft conviction implie:s dishonesty, it may be a basis for·
impeaching petitioner's te:stimony in a court proceeding. People v.
Stufliebean. 24 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1068--1169, 322 N. E. 2d 488, 491-492'
(1974) . Becauoe jurors must, be of "fair character" and "approved
integrity," Ill. Hcv. Stat. ch. 78 § 2 (1977), petitioner may be excluded
from jury duty as a result of his theft conviction. Twelve occupa.tions
licensed under Illinois Jaw and 23 occupation:; licensed uuder city of
Chicago ordinances require the Hcense app!icant to have "good mora:I
character" or some equivalent, background qualification that could be
found lll1&'tti8fied b<'cause of a theft convict.ion. See Chicago Council of
Lawyers, Study of Licensing Restrictions on Ex-Offenders in the City of
Chicago and the State of Illinois 8, A-17 (1975). Under federal law
petitioner's theft. conviction would bar him from working in any capacity
in a bank in:sured by the F. D. I. C., 12 U. S. C. § 1829, or po:s:sibly in any
public or private employment requiring a security clearance. 32 CFR
§ 155.5 (h) and (i), and§ 156 .7 (b) (1) (iii) (1977) .
11
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335, 344 (1963); see .Junker, The
Right to Counsel in Misdemeallor Ca~e::;, 43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 713-714
(1968) .
u My Brother PowELL's concurrence in Argersinger, 407 U. S., at 44,
joined by my Brother REHNQU1::;T, also ::;upports petitioner',; right to
appointed counsel in this ca.se. The concurrence explicitly stated that the
right to counsel should extend at least as far as the right. to jury trial,
id .. at 45-46, and its preference for a case-by-ca~e approach was repea.tedly
limited to " petty" offense::;. See, e. g .. id. , at. 45, and n. 2, 47, 63. Even
in petty offenses, the Argersinger concurrence would have mandated the·
following procedures :
"The determination [whether coun,;el mu:;t be appointed] should be made·
hefore the accused for.roally vleads ; many petty cases are resolved hy·

. ,.
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III
But rather than decide consonant with the assumption in
regard to nonpetty offenses that was both implicit and explicit
in Argersinger, the Court today retreats to the indefensible
position that the Argersinger "actua:.l imprisonment" stalldard
is the only test for determining the boundary of the Sixth
Amendment right to appointed counsel in state misdemeanor
cases, thus necessarily deciding that in many cases (such as
this one) a defendant will have 110 right to appointed counsel
even when he has a constitutional right to a jury trial. This
is simply an intolerable result. Not only is the "actual imprisonment" standard unprecedented as the exclusive test, but
the problems inherent in its application demonstrate the
superiority of an "authorized imprisonment" standard that
would require the appointment of counsel for indigents
accused of any offense for which imprisonment for any time
·is authorized.
First, the authorized imprisonment standard more faithfully implements the principles of the Sixth Amendment iden-·
tified in Gideon. The procedural rules estab[ished by state·
statutes are geared to the nature of the potential penalty for
an offense, not to the actual penalty imposed in particular
cases. The authorized penalty is also a better · predictor of
the stigma and other collateral consequences that attach to
guilty p'eas in which the assistance of cotmsrl may be required. If the·
trial court should conclude that the assistance of counsel is not required
in any case, it should state its rea~ons so t.hat the issue could be preserved
:for review." Id., at 63.
My Brother POWELL neverthele,;-; concurs in this case withont c-onfronting the apparent inconsistenciP:s with his po~ition in Argersinger. His
concurrence is based in part on an ex po~t- facto review of what occurred
at frial :
"The prosecutor made no opening or closing statement, did not ob,iect tn
any test,imony offered by petitionn, declined the eourt's invitation . tOJ

."

,.

\.

.

,,·, ...

,,

~

',:".

1,"•:

~:

,·

:

.. ·

17-1177-DISSENT
'·
SCOTT v. ILLINOIS

9

conviction of an offense. 13 With the exception of Argersinger,
authorized penalties have been used consistently by this Court
as the true measures of the seriousness of offenses. See, e. g.,
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 68-70 ( 1970); Frank v.
United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969); United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 ( 1922). Imprisonment is a sanction particularly associated with criminal offenses; trials of offenses punishable by imprisonment accordingly possess the characteristics found by Gideon to require the appointment of counsel.
By contrast, the actual imprisonment standard, as the Court's
opinion in this case demonstrates, denies the right to counsel
in criminal prosecutions to accuseds who suffer the severe consequences of prosecution other than imprisonment.
cross-examine the petitioner, and called no rebuttal witnesses. The trial
court, in contrast, took an aci ive role in questioning the petitioner about
the facts surrounding hb arrest ." Ante, at 4.
My Brother PowELL neglects to mention that without petit,ioner's own
testimony the prosecution had not proved he did not pay for the item he
allegedly stole, or that the judge'» questions were apparently motivated by
the prosecutbr'8 refusal to develop the facts on his own adequately to
satisfy the judge's reawnable doubts. See Appendix, at 9. The problems
posed by such post-hoc analyses of the fairnrss of proceedings and of how
proceedings might have been different if courn,el had been appointed
demonstra.te the wisdom of the Court's po8ition, most recently 11eaflirmed
in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475, 487-491 (1978), that prejudice is
conclusively presumed when the right. to m;sistanee of counsel is denied:
" The right to have the assi:-<ta.nce of counsel is too fundamental and
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculatjons as t.o the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial." Id., at 488 ( quoting Glasser v. United
States, 315 U. S. 60, 75-76 (1942). See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
13, 43 (STEWAH'r, J., concurring) .
1 8 See n. 10, supra.
The ,;cope of colla.teral consequences that would be
corn,titutionally permis,,ible under the actual imprisonment standard remain:'l tmsettlerl, and this uncertainty is another i,;ourcc of confusion
generated by this standard . SPP, e. y .. Tr. of Orn] Arg., at 35-37; United
States v. White, 529 F . 2d 1390 (CA8 1976) ; Note, Argersinger v. Hamlin
and the Collateral Use of Prior Mi:;demeanor Convictions of Indigents
Umepresented by Counsel at. Tnal, 35 Ohio St. L. J1• 168 (1D74) .

.: .
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Second, the "authorized imprisonment" test presents no
problems of administra.tion. It avoids the necessity for timeconsuming consideration of the likely seute11ce iu each individual case before trial and the attendant problems of inaccurak
predictio11s, unequal treatment. aud apparent and actual bias.
These problems with the actual imprisomnent standard wf'rl'
suggested in my Brother PowELL's concurrence in A rgersinger, 407 U. S .. at 52-55. which was echoed in scholarly
criticism of that decision.'' Petitioner emphasizes these defects, arguing with considerable force that implementation of
the actual imprisonment stamlard must assuredly lead to
violations of both the Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses of the Constitution. Brief for Petitioner. at 47-59.
Finally. the "authorized imprisonment" test ensures that
courts will not abrogate legislative judgments concerning the
appropriate range of peualties to be considered for each
offense.
Under the actual imprisonmeut standard,
"[t]he judge will ... be forced to decide in advance of
trial-and without hearing the evidence-whether he will
forgo entirely his judicial discretion to impose some sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility to
consider the full range of punishments established by the
legislature. His alternatives, assuming the availability
of counsel, will be to appoint counsel and retain the
discretion vested in him by law, or to abandon this
discretion in advance and proceed without counsel.'~
14
See, e. g., S. Krantz el al., Right to Counsel in Criminal Case,: The
Mandato of Argen,inger v. Hamlin 69-117 (1!)76): Duke, Thr Ri1d1t to
Appointed Counsel: Argcrsinger and He~·ond, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rrv. 601
(1975) .
Th ~ case-by-case approach advocatrd by my Brother PowELL in
Argersinger has al,;o been criticized as unworkable because of the administrntivr burden it would impose. Ser, e. g., National ConfNenrr of
Commiss1onen; on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Rulrs of Criminal Pro~edurr, Rule 321 (b), Comnwnt, p . 69.

'
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Argersinger v. H arnlin, 407 U. S., at 53

11
(POWELL,

J.,

concurring).
The authorized imprisomnent standard. on the other hand,
respects the allocation of functions between legislatures and
eourts i11 the admi11istration of the criminal justice system.
The apparent reason for the Court's adoption of the
"actual imprisonment" standard for all misdemeauors is concern for the economic burden that an "authorized imprisonment" standard might place 011 the States. But. with all
respect. that concern is both irrelevaut and speculative.
This Court's role in euforcing constitutional guarantees for
criminal defendants cannot be made dependent on the budgetary decisions of state governments. A unanimous Court made
that clear in Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189, 196-197
( 1971), in rejecting a proposed fiscal justification for providing
free transcripts for appeals only when the appellant was subject to imprisonment:
"This argument misconceives the principle of Griffin [v.
lll-inois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956)] . . . . Griffin does not
represent a balance betwee11 the needs of the accused and
the interests of society; its principle is a flat prohibition
against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an
appeal as would be available to others able to pay their·
own way. The invidiousness of the discrimination that
exists when criminal procedures are made available only
to those who can pay is not erased by any differences in
the sentences that may be imposed. The State's fiscal
interest is, therefore, irrelevant." Li~J

In any event, the extent of the alleged burden on the States
is. as the Court admits, ante, at 6-7, 11. 5, speculative. Although more persons are charged with misdemeanors punishable by incarceration than are charged with felonies. a smaller
percentage of persons charged with misdemeanors qualify as;
i ::i see ali-o Bound~ v . $1mith, 430 U . S. 817., 84-"5 (.1977.)_

~.,
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indigent, and misdemeanor cases as a rule require far less
attorney time.10
Furthermore, public defender systems have proved economica1ly feasible, and the establishment of such systems to replace
1:1,ppointmeut of private attorneys can keep costs at acceptable
Jevels even when the number of cases requiring appointment
of counsel increases drarnatically. 11 ' The public defender system alternative also answers the argument that an authorized
imprisonment standard would clog the courts with inexperienced appointed counsel.
Perhaps the strongest refutation of respondent's alarmist
prophecies that an authorized imprisonment standard would
wreak havoc 011 the States is that the standard has not procluced that result in the substantial number of States that
already provide counsel in all cases where imprisonment is
authorized-States that include a 113-rge majority of the counft
try's population and a great diversity of urban and rural
10

See National ConferenC"e of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Uniform Rule:; of Criminal. Procednre, Rule · 321 (b) Comment, p. 70
(1974) (ei:<timate;; that only 10% of misdemeanor defendant,~, a;; opposed
to 60-65% of felony defendant:;, meet the neces"'a.ry indigency standard);
National LPgal Aid & Defender As::1'u, The Other Face of Ju::,tice, Note I,
pp. 82-Sa (197:3) (survey indi cat~::; national avPragfl i::; 65 % indigency in
f Plony cases and only 47% in misdemeanor cases) .
The National AdviHory Commi::;:,;ion on Criminal Ju::;tice Stnnda,rcls and
Goals adopted a. maximum ca;;eload standard of 150 felony cases or 400
misdemeanor cases per attorne~· per year. National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standard;; & Goals; Conrts, Standard 1:3.12, pp . 276277 (1973). Sf'e al~o The Other Face of Jui:itice, S'upra, Table 109, at p. 73,
17 A ::;tu dy conducted in the State of Wiscon;;iu, which introduced a
State PubliC' DefenclPr System after the Wiscon~in Supreme Court in
State e.r rd. Winnie v. Harris. 75 Wi R. 2d 547, 249 N. W. 2d 791 (H/77,).
extPndecl th<> right to coumel in the war urged by 1wtitioner in this case,.
1ndicRted t lmt. the average cost of providing cmmtiel in a rniHdPmcanor ca&'
was reduced from $150-200 to $90 b~, lltiing ,L puhlie defender rather than
appointing private coun;-;el. Brief for A mic'us (}uriae N,Itioual Leg;;tif
Aid & Defender A::;sn,, at 10-12.
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environments. 18 Moreover, of those States that do not yet
provide counsel in all cases where any irnprisomneut is author ..
ized, many provide counsel when periods of irnprisoumeut
18 Sce, e. g., ALASKA:
Alaska C"onst. .. Art. l § 11; Alaska Stat.
§ 18.85.100 (a) (1974) (an~· offPn8c' p11nishahlP b~· inenrreration; or which
ma,y rrs11lt in loss of va!uab!e licrn,.:o or hrav~· finp); Alexander v. City of
Anchorage. 490 P. 2d !HO (1971); AHIZONA: Ariz. Huie Crim. Proe ..

R11le 6.1 (b) (Supp. 1978) (nnr criminal procc>Pdings which may rPH11lt in
punishnwnt b~· Jos.~ of liberty; or whpre thr eo11rt. coneh1des that the
interest, of justict• so requires): CALIFOR~IA: Cal. Penal Code § 987
(West Supp. 1978) (all rrimillal casrs); CONNECTICUT: !-l Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §§ 51-296 (a), 51-:297 (f) (Supp. 197H) (all criminal actions);
DELA WARE: Del. Code Ann ., tit. 29, § 4602 (l!:!74) (all indigC'nts undel."
arrest, or eharged with crime if defPndan1 re4uc-'8ts or court orders);
HAWAII: Haw. Hev. Sta.t., tit. 37, § 802-1 (Hl7fi) (an~· offeusr punishable hy confinement in jail); J:NDIANA: Ind. Con,.;!.., Art. I, § 13 (all
criminal prosc•cntions); Bolkovac v. 8tatP of lncliana, 229 Ind. 294, 98
N. E. 2d 250 (1951) ; KENTUCKY: 17 Ky. Rule Crim. Proe., Rule 8.04
(1978) (offrnsr:.; puni,.;hablc b~· ;L finC' of more than $500 orb~· imprisonment) ; LOUISIANA: La . Stal. Ann., Code Crim. Proc., Art,. 518 (Supp.
1978) (offrni;es punishable b~· irnprismm1ent); :VIASSACHUSETTS: Mass.
Supr. ,lucl. Ct . Grn . Rule :uo (anr crime for which Sf'ntC'nec of imprisonment may be imposed); ~IINNESOTA: :\fiun. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.02,
611.14 (SuJJJl . 1979) (felonie.,; nncl '·gro"" misdm1eanons"; "tatute defines·
" petty" misdPmeanors as tho,<P not punishable by imprisonnlPnt or fine
over $100) ; NEW HA:V1PSHIRE : N. H. Rev. Stat,. Ann. §§ 604-A:2·,
625:9 (1974) (offPnse.,; punishablr by imprisonment.); NEW MEXICO:
N. Mex. Stat.. Ann.§ 41- 22A-12 (Supp. 1975) (offeni;e carr~·ing a possible'
scntenec of imprisonment.) ; NEW YORK: C. P . L. § 170.10 (1971) (all
misdemranon; cxct'pt, traffic violation,.;); People v. Weinstock, 80 Misc.
2d 510, Fill, 36:~ N . Y. S. 2d 878 (1974) (traffic violations subject to
possible imprisonment); OKLAHO::.VIA: Okl,L. Stat. Ann. 22-464. 1271
(1969) (all criminal cases) ; Stewart v . State, 495 P. 2d 834 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1972) ; OREGON : Brown v. M ultnornah County Dist. Ct., 29 Ore.
App. 917, 56G P . 2d 522 (1977) (all crimina.l case.,;) ; SOUTH DAKOTA:
S. D . Comp . UlWI'\ Ann . § 2:3-2-1 (Supp . 1978) (any criminal action) ;
TENNESSEE: TPlln. Code Ann . §§ 40-2002, 40-20Da (1975) (persons
a ccu~ed of any crtmf' or misdemeanor what,-oever) ; Tl<-:XAS: TPX. Code
C rim. ProC' . Art . 26.04 (Hlfi5) (an~· fplon~· or mi~demPanor 1n111iAhable b)··
-impri,;onmcnt); VIRGINI A: Va . Code Ann ., §§ 19.2- 157, 19 .2-160 (.SuvJ?-
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longer than 30 days. 10 3 months, 20 or 6 months 21 are authorized. In fact. Scott would be entitled to appointed counsel
under the curreut laws of at least 33 States. 22
1978) (miRdPmPanors thr penalty for which may bP confinemrnt. in jail);
WASHINGTON: Wm;h . .J. Crim. Rule 2.11 (a) (1) (1978) (all criminal
offenses punishable by loss of libPrty): WEST VIRGINIA: W. Va. Code
Ann. § 62-3-lH (Supp. 1977) (per:,ous under indictment for a crime):
WISCONSIN: Wis. Const., Art. 1, § 7, State ex rel. Wiunie Han·is. 75
Wis. 2d 547, 249 N. W. 2d 791 (1977) (nil criminal prosecutions).
Respondent claim:,; that thr <"tatutes and case la,w in ,;omp of thesr cases
" nPed not Le rPad as requiring appoiutmrnt of counsel for all imprisonable ca::;es." RespondPnt 's Brief, at :3;3 n. 28. Although the law is not
unambiguous in every ca,;e, ambiguit ie::; in the laws of other Sta.tr,; suggest
that thfl list, is verhaps too ,;hort, or nt l*•ast that other States provide
counsel in all but, the most trivial offensrs. E. g., COLORADO: Colo.
Rev. Stal ,. Ann. § 21-1-103 (Hl74) (all mii::demeanors and all municipal
code violations at the discretion of the public defender); GEORGIA: Ga.
Code Ann ., § 27-320:3 (1078) (any viulntion of a state la.w or local
ordinance which may result in inc:u·crration); MISSOURI: Attorney
General Opinion No. 207, Young 6-21-G3 (counsel should be appointed in
misdemeanor cases of "more than minor significancp" and "where prejudice
might result"); ~IONTANA: :\font. Rrv. Code Ann. § 95-1001 (1969)
( court may assign counsel in misdemPauors " in the intrrest, of justice") ;
NEVADA: NPv. Rev. Stat. § 171.397 (1973) (persons aecm,ed of "gross
misdcmP1rnors" or felonies); NEW ,JEHSEY: N . .J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 158
(A) (197:3) ; N. J. Crim. Rules 3:27-1 (1973) (any offensp which Is
indictable) ; PENNSYLVANIA: Pa. Huie Crim. Proc. 316 (a.)-(C') (Supp.
1978) (in all but "summary cas<>s"); WYOMING: W,vo. ShL. Ann.
§§ 7-1-110 (a) (Pntitled to appointed co1msPl in ''seriuu~ rrimes"), 7-1108 (v) (srrious crimes are those for whirh inrarcprntion is n " practical
possibility"), 7-9-105 (all case,; where accused shall or may be punished
by imprisonment. in penitentinry) (1977).
In addition, Alabama, Florida, Grorgia, and Mi:,;sissippi wrrP until today
covpred by the Fifth Circuit's adoption of the "authorized imprisonment"
standard. See Potts v. Estelle, 529 F. 2d 450 (CA5 1976); Thomas v.
Savage, 513 F. 2d 536 (CA5 1075) .
Several 8tates that havp, not adoptPCl the authorized imprisonment
standard give courts discretionary authority to nppoint cmmsel in eases
where it is pPrccived to be nrcessary (e. g .. Maryland, Missouri, Montana.,
Torth Dakota, Ohio, and Pennsylvania).
[Footnotes W, 20, 21, and 22. are on 1). 16]
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It may well be that adoption of an authorized imprisonment
sta11dard will lead states and local governments to re-exam·
ine their criminal statutes. A state legislature or local government may determine that it uo longer desires to authorize
i u IOWA : Iowa Code Ann ., § 8Ia.2, n .nle '2 § 3 ; § 813.3, Rule 42 § 3
(1978 Spec. Pamphlet) .
2 0 MARYLAND : Md . Ann . Code, Art. 27 A, § 2 (h), 164 (1976) ;
MISSISSIPPI : Mis;;. Code Ann. § 99- 15-15 ( 1972) .
2
1IDAHO : Idaho Code Ann . tit. Hl, § 851 (1978); Mahler\', Birnbaum,
95 Idaho 14, 501 P. 2d 282 (l\:l72) : ~IAINE: Newell v . State, 277 A. 2d
731 (Maine, 1971) ; OHIO : Ohio Huie Crim. C . P ., Huie 2, Rule
44 (A) (B) (1975) ; RHODE ISLAND: Supr. Huie Crim. Proc. 44; Rule
C rim. Proc. 44 (1976) ; St ate v. Halliday, 280 A. 2d 33:3 (S11pr. Ct. 1971) ;
UTAH : Utah Code Am1., § 77- 64-2 (Suw. 1977) ; Salt Lake City Corp .
v. Salt foke Cou.nty , 520 P . 2d 2112 (Snpl'. Ct . 1974) .
2 2 See nn . 1&-22, supra. The actual frgure may be clo:;er to 40 State;;.
The following Sta t es appear to b<' governed only by the ''likelihood of
imprisonment" :standard: ARKANSAS: Ark. Huie Crim . Proc., Huie 8.2 (b)
(1977) (all criminal offenses ,except in misdemeanor cases where court
determines that, under no circumstance's will conviction re:sult in imJ)risonment ) ; FLORIDA: Fla . Huie Crim. Proc . 3.111 (b) (1975) (any misdemeanor or municipal ordinance violation unles:; prior writ.ten ,::ta.tement
by judge that conviction will uot ret,illlt in impri:,;onment); NORTH
CAROLINA: N. C. Gen. Stat., § 7A-451 (a) (Supp. 1977) (any cai;e in
which imprisonment or a fine of $500 or more i,; likely t-0 be adjudged);
NORTH DAKOTA : N . D . Cent. Code, Rule Crim . Pror., Huie 44 (1974)
(all nonfelony cases unle:ss magi:;trate determine;, that, sentence upon
convictio11 will not include impri:,;onment); VEHMONT : Ver. Stat. Ann.,
§ 13-5201-5231 (Supp. 1977) (any misdemeanor puni:shab!e by any period
of impri:;onment or fine over $1,000 unle~$ prior determinatio11 that imprisonment or fine over $1,000 will not be imposed). Two State:; l'equire
appointmmt of counsel for indigents in case:s where i1, is " <'onstitutionally
required" : ALABAMA : Ala. Code, tit. 15, §§ 15-12-1, 15-12-20 (1975) ;
SOUTH CAHOLINA : S. C. Code § 17-3-10 (1977) . Some, States require
counsel in misdemeanor case,; only by virtue of judicial deci:sions reacting
to Argersinger: KANSAS: State v. Giddings. 2Hi Kan. 14, 21-22, 531 P.
2d 445 (1975) ; MICHIGAN: People v. Studebaker, 387 Mich. 698, 199
N . W . 2d 177 (1972) ; People v. Harri!;, 45 :\lich. App. 217, 206 N. W . 2d
478, 480 (1973); ~EBRASKA : Kovarik v . County of Bar/1l er, 224 N . W.
2d 761 (Neb . 1975) .

77-1177-DISSENT
SCOTT v. ILLINOIS

16

incarceration for certain minor offe11scs in light of thf' ex1wnse
of meeting the requireme11ts of the Constitution. lu my view
this re-examination is loug overclue. 2 " In ally Pvent, the
Court's actual imprisonrnPnt standard must inevitably lead
the courts to make this re-examiuation, which plainly should
more properly be a legislative responsibility.

IV
The Court's opinion turns the reasoning of Argersinger on
its head. It restricts the right to counsel, perhaps the most
fundamental Sixth Amendment rightt1 more narrowly tha.ll
the admittedly less fuudamental right to jury trial. 2 " The
abstract pretext that "constitutional line drawing becomes
more difficult as the reach of the Constitution is exteuded further, and as efforts are made to transpose lines from one area
of Sixth Amendment jurisprudeuce to another," ante, at 5,
cannot camouflage the anomalous result the Court reaches.
The Court's opinion reminds one of Mr. Justice Black's
description of Betts v. Brady: "an anachronism when handed
down" that "ma[kes] an abrupt break with its own wellconsidered precedents." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at
345, 344.

2"

24

See e. g., S. Krantz et al., s·upra, n. 14, at 445-606.
"In an advers:1ry system of criminal justic<:>, thi:-rr i:s no right more

essential than the righ1. to the a:ssistanc<:> of counse!."

Lakeside v. Oregon,

.,rn5 U.S. 333,341 (1978).
"[T]ho i11terest protected by thC' right to have guilt or innocenc<:>
determined by a jury-temperinµ; the poE:s:bly arbitrary and harsh <:>xercisc
of prosecutorial and judicial power-while important, i:s not, 11,; fundamental to the guarantee of 11 fair trial as iH tho right to <·ot111::1:>l."
Arger·singer v. Hamlin. 407 U. S., at 4fi (Powt:i,L, ,T., concurring) (foot-.
Dote~ omitted) .
25

2.

the petr in the present case, for he had a right to a
jury trial.

See Brennan's opinion, at 6-7 & n. 12.

We have talked about this before.

The sentence

quoted by Justice Brennan is followed immediately by a
discussion that clearly indicates that the relationship
between the rights to counsel and jury trial is based on
the need for the assistance of counsel before the jury.
"An unskilled layman may be able to defend himself in a
nonjury trial before a judge experienced in piecing together
unassembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coherent
whole consistent with the best case on behalf of the
defendant.

If there is no accompanying right to coumel,

the right to a jury trial becomes meaningless."
at 46.

Id.,

Where the defendant makes a valid waiver of

his right to a jury trial, the need for assistance of
counsel before a jury obviously cannot require or
justify appointment of counsel.
We have already met Justice Brennan's criticism
on this point to a significant extent.

We mention the

waiver of jury trial at pp. 1 and 4, and quote from
your explanation of the need for counsel in jury trials
at p. 2.
p. 2 )

C

I propose that we add the footnote indicated at

'J°I

a/-f-1cfeef

3.

Justice Brennan's second criticism rests on the
procedures you recommended for trial courts in your
Argersinger opinion.

There you indicated that in

administering the due process standard of fairness, the
trial judges should inquire, before the defendant enters
his plea, into the need for counsel, and should place on
the record the reasons supporting a conclusion that
counsel is not required.

Id., at 63.

Brennan's opinion, at 7 n. 12.

See Justice

Since the trial judge

did not conduct such an inquiry on the record in the
present case, Justice Brennan seems to think that you
are committed to concluding that the defendant was
denied due process .

I am sure that he draws support

for his conclusion on this point from the final sentence
of your Argersinger opinion:

'~s the proceedings in the

courts below were not in accordance with the views
expressed above, I concur in the result of the decision
in this case.".

Id. , at 66

I have always taken the view that the final sentence
of your Argersinger opinion referred to the failure of
the trial proceedings to conform with the requirements of
them
due process as you had expounded/In the opinion. Thus,
you indicated that should counsel not be appointed for

4.

an indigent, "[t]he trial court would then become obligated
to scrutinize carefully the subsequent proceedings for the
protection of the defendant.

If an unrepresented defendant

sought to enter a plea of guilty, the Court shald examine
the case against him to insure that there is admissible evidence tending to support the elements of the offense.

If

a case went to trial without defense counsel, the court
should intervene, when necessary, to insure that the
defendant adequately brings out the facts in his favor and
to prevent legal issues from being overlooked.

Formal

trial rules should not be applied strictly against
unrepresented defendants.

Finally, appellate courts

should carefully scrutinize all decisions not to appoint
counsel and the proceedings which follow."

Id., at 63-64.

--

It is true that here, the trial court did not
pursue on the record an inquiry into the need for
assistance of counsel.

Although that failure does

make review of the fairness of the trial more difficult,
I do not think that anything in your Argersinger opinion
indicates that this failure is itself a due process
violation.

I suggest we add the sentence indicated at

p. 4 of the concurring opinion to make clear the focus
of appellate review under the Due Process Clause.

to~· 'fbe Ch-1e1' J(ist1vc

· Jtr. Juetioe ,~
Mr. Jua'iioe,, Sti:,\ial't
Kr. Juettoe White
tfr. Just1oe
Mr. Justice
)(r. Ju.stice
11r. Justioe

From:
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Yarshe.1.1
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Reh'nquiet
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MR.

·PowELL, concurring in the judgment.
The petitioner was tried · for shoplifting under an Illinois
statute providing for a maximum penalty of a $500 fine or one
year in jail, or both. After waiving his right to a jury trial,
the petitioner was convicted and fined $50. · ·The Court rejects
the petitioner's argument that as an indigent, he should
have been provided with counsel because imprisonment was
an authorized penalty for the crime with which he was
charged. Relying on Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25
( 1972), the Court holds instead that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require the States to provide counsel only to
indigents who are sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Although I concur in the affirn1ance of the petitioner's conviction, I am unable to join· the opinion of the Court. See
·id., at 44 (POWELL, J., concurring).
The Court's opinion, with cotnmendable candor, states that
"our decided cases ·[haveJ departed from the literal meaning of
the Sixth Arne11dment," Ante, at 5. This acknowledgement is
highlighted by the absence of historical or prececle11tial justification for the line the Court draws to limit the "already extended" reach of the Sixth Amendment. -Ibid. As the Sixth
Amendment provides no guidance in this area, the Court
should recur to the Due ;Process Clause, which in its basic con·
cept of fairness gives full recog11ition to the constitutional
interests of crimirial defendants. -Instead, the Court finds in
the Sixth Amendment a categorica,l difference between indi-

.~
.·,
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gent state misdemeanor defendants who are sentenced to
imprisonment and those who are not, and concludes that the
Constitution guarantees only the former group the right to
assistance of appointed counsel.
The rule adopted by the Court in this case and in Argersinger is easy to apply, in the sense that a state court can have
to doubt as to this prerequisite for an imposition of a sentence
of imprisonment. For the reasons set forth in my opinion in
Argers-inger, however, I adhere to my view that the Court's
rule imposes burdens on both defendants and the public that
are too severe to be justified by the apparent simplicity of the
rule"

Some defendants may be affected more seriously by the
payment of a fine. the loss of a driver's license. or the impact
of the stigma attached to a conviction. than by a brief incarcerat10n. Yet no ma.tter how serious the nonimprisonment
consequences of conviction. there is no right to counsel under
the Court's rule unless a sentence of imprisonment also is imposed. Similarly, defendants who do not have a right to
counsel under the Court's rule may be faced by legal or factual
questions as complex as those raised by the charges against
defendants who are sentenced to prisou. T'he lack of counsel
may be es1wcially unfair where a defendant who is not afforded counsel under the Court's rule exercises a right to trial
by Jury, for "before a jury the guiding hand of counsel isneeded to marshal the evidence into a coherent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of the defendant." Id., at
46 ( PowELL, J .. concurring) .1
The Court's rule, in addition to denying assistance of counsel unfairly in some cases, also impairs the functioning of
the criminal justice system. Most misdemeanor and petty
crime statutes provide for imprisonment, a fine, or both. The

j

1 When , on tlw othl'r hand, fht' d<,l'rndant waiw,; hi,- right to a jur.v
trial, th1,.; particular r<'a"on for affordmg him thr a,.;~j"t.wcr o[ HJ):l,>0i11tedl
<tfo1m"r·l i, nof pN1 Illf'Jtt...
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penalty provisions of such statutes are intended to afford the
judge considerable flexibility in fitting the sentence to the
circumstances and severity of the offense and to the record of
the offender. The "bright line" adopted by the Court in this
cii,se and Argersinger inevitably frustrates this important purpose. The trial judge, in advance of hearing any evidence,
indeed, in advance of knowing anything about the case except
the charge, must decide whether he will forego the legislatively granted authority to impose a sentence of imprisonment
upon conviction. Unless the judge surrenders this option, he
must appoint counsel to assist the indigent defendant. Thus,
the Court's rule forces the trial judge to make an important
preliminary sentencing decision without the knowledge on
which such decisions should be based.
Moreover, given the practical realities of the misdemeanor
and petty offense trial courts in the States, one can forsee
readily the direction in which the Argersinger rule will distort
the penalties imposed. In busy metropolitan courts, where
dockets are overcrowded and delay already is intolerable, trial
judges are likely to dispense with the option of imprisonment
rather than further delay proceedings to secure counsel for an
indigent defendant. In rural counties and small towns, remote from metropolitan bars and of ten strapped for funds,
counsel may be wholly unavailable or else beyond the financial
means of the local government. As a result, in many cases
in which due process would not require assistance of counsel,
the trial judge will be pressured nonetheless to foreclose the
option of a sentence of imprisonment. 2
Quite apart from the irrationalities and distortions introduced into the sentencing decisions of state trial judges, the
Court's rule has a serious impact on another important public
interest. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the deter" See National Leii:al Aid and Defender A,-;sn ., Tlw Other Face of
,Justice 38-40, 63-64 (1973) ; Argersinger, supra, at 55-61 (PowELL, J.,
concurring).

.

~

.

,,' .

..,
~

'·

..

•,

'•

77-1177-CONCUR
4

SCOTT v. ILLINOIS

rent effect of the misdemeanor and petty offense laws is
weakened by a systematic reduction in the number of jail
sentences imposed. The Court's rule will also make the enforcement of fines against recalcitrant defendants difficult, if
not impossible, as it seems unlikely that the Court contemplates the circumvention of its rule by the jailing of uncounseled indigents for failure to pay such fines. Id., at 55
(POWELL, J., concurring) .
In sum, the Argersinger line often will result in unfairness
to defendants, and in many other situations seems likely to
disserve the public interest in a rational and effective system
of criminal justice. These flaws are but indications of the
lack of any constitutional basis for the Court's categorical rule.
In my view, the very concept of fairness as a due process doctrine applicable to each trial precludes such inflexible linedrawing. Rather, in each case the trial judge should decide
whether fairness requires appointment of counsel after considering the complexity of the offense charged, the severity of
the sentence that might follow conviction, and other factors
peculiar to each case. In my opinion in Argersinger, I reviewed this inquiry, and the demands that it would place on
state trial judges. Id., at 64-65 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Whether or not the trial court pursued this inquiry on the \
record, the appellate courts reviewing the conviction of an
uncounseled indigent must determine whether the failure to
provide counsel denied the defendant a fair trial. Here, the
petitioner waived a jury trial on a simple charge of shoplifting
several items valued at $13.68. The prosecutor made no
opening or closing statement, did not object to any testimony
offered by the petitioner, declined the court's invitation to
cross-examine the petitioner, and called no rebuttal witnesses.
The trial court, in contrast. took au active role in questioning
the petit1011er about the facts surrounding his arrest. In sum,\
it does not appear that there was any unfairness in trying the
petitioner without affording him the assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, I .ioin iii the judgment affirming his conviction. )
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Mn.

rlissrnting.
For substa11tially tlw rrasons sta.tf'cl hy iVIH. Jt·wr1c1D BHENNAN in Parts I and IT df his dissenting opinion. I would hold
that thl' right to counsel sr('ured hy the Sixth a11d Fourteenth
Amendm<'nts <'Xtcnds at ·1east as far fl$ tlw right to jury trial
secur0d by those amendmN1ts. Af'f'ordi11gly, I would hold
that an indigC'nt ddC'ndant in ·a state criminal case must bP
affonh•d appointf'd counsel wlH'IH'VPr t-lw dde11da11t is prosecuted for a nonpetty criminal offf'ns-e, that is. 01w punishable
hy mor<' than six months' imprisonment. see Vuntan v.
Louisiana, :391 r. 8. 145 (19GR); Bnldim:n v. New York, 399
U. ~- oo (Hl70). or whenever tlH' rlefrndant is convicted of an
offf'nSf' and is actually subjected to a krm of irnprisonrnc'11t,
Arr;ers-iuyer V. Hrimlin, 407 r. R. 25 (1972).
This resolution. I feel. would provide tht: "bright, line" that
<lefot 1cla11 ts, prosecutors, and trial and appellate <'Ourts all
rle8ervp and. at the sa1nc time. would reconcilf' 011 a princip!Pd
basis the i111portant considerations that led to the rlPcisiom; in
Duncan, BaldW'in, and Argersi11yer.
On this approach. of course. the judgment of the Ruprcmr
Court of Illinois upholding petitioner Scott's conviction should
lJc• l'<'V<'rsed. since he was convictl'd of an offenst' for which
he was constitutionally r•ntitl<'d to a, jury trial. r, th<'t·eforc:
, disi-en t.
JrsTTCJ·: RLACKMUN,
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment.
The petitioner was tried for shoplifting under an Illinois
statute providing for a maximum penalty of a $500 fine or one
year in jail, or both. After waiving his right to a jury trial,
the petitioner was convicted and fined $50. The Court rejects
the petitioner's argument that as an indigent, he should
have been provided with counsel because imprisonment was
an authorized penalty for the crime with which he was
charged. Relying on Argersinger v. H arnlin, 407 U. S. 25
( 1972), the Court holds instead that the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments require the States to provide counsel only to
indigents who are sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Although I concur in the affirmance of the petitioner's conviction , I am unable to join the opinion of the Court. See
id., at 44 (POWELL, 'J., concurring).
The Court's opinion, with commendable candor, states that
"our decided cases ·[haveJ departed from the literal meaning of
the Sixth Amendment. " Ante, at 5. This acknowledgement is
highlighted by the absence of historical or precedential justification for the line the Court draws to limit the "already extended" reach of the Sixth Amendment. Ibid. As the Sixth
Arnendme11t provides no guidance in this area, the Court
should recur to the Due Process Clause, which in its basic con:cept of fairness gives full recognition to the constitutional
interests of criminal defendants. Instead, the Court finds in
the Sixth Amendment a categorical difference between indi.

a
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gent state misdemeanor defendants who are sentenced to
imprisonment and those who are not, and concludes that the
Constitution guarantees only the former group the right to
assistance of appointed counsel.
The rule adopted by the Court in this case and in Argersinger is easy to apply, in the sense that a sta.te court can have
no doubt as to this prerequisite for an imposition of a sentence I
of imprisonment. For the reasons set forth in my opinion in
Argersinger, however, I adhere to my view that the Court's
rule imposes burdens on both defendants and the public that
are too severe to be justified by the apparent simplicity of the
rule.
Some defendants may be affected more seriously by the
payment of a fine, the loss of a driver's license, or the impact
of the stigma attached to a conviction, than by a brief incarceration. Yet no rna.tter how serious the nonimprisonment
consequences of conviction, there is no right to counsel under
the Court's rule unless a sentence of imprisonment also is imposed. Similarly, defendants who do not have a right to
counsel under the Court's rule may be faced by legal or factual
questions as complex as those raised by the charges aga.inst
defendants who are sentenced to prison. The lack of counsel
may be especially unfair where a defendant who is not afforded counsel under the Court's rule exercises a right to trial
by jury. for "before a jury the guiding hand of counsel is
needed to marshar the evidence into a coherent whole consiste11 t with the best case on behalf of the defendant." Id., at
46 (POWELL, L concurring) .1
The Court's rule, in addition to denying assistance of counsel unfairly in some cases, also impairs the functioning of
the criminal justice system. Most misdemeanor and petty
crime statutes provide for imprisonment, a fine, or both. TheWhen, on the other hand, the defendant waives his right to a jury
trial, this particular rea:son for affording him the assistance of appointed
<tfliW!Sel is not pertinent,.
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penalty provisions of such stattites are intended to affottd the
judge considerable tlexibility in fitting the sentence to ·the
circumstances and sever.ity of the offense and to the record of
the offender. The "'bright line" adopted by the Court in this
case and Argersinger inevitably frustrates this important -pur~
pose. The trial judge, in advance, of he~ring any evidence,
indeed, in adva;1ce of knowing anything ,about the case except
the charge, must decide whether he wilf 'forego the legislatively granted authority to impose a senteric·e of imprisonment
upon conviction:'- Unless the judge' surrenders this option, he
must appoint counsel to assi~t the indigent defendant. · Thus,
the Court's rule forces the trial judge to make an important
preliminary sentencing decision without the knowledge -on
which such decisions should be based.
Moreover, given the practical realities of the misdemeanor
and petty offense tria-1 courts in the States, one can forsee
readily the direction in which the Argersinger rule will distort
the penalties imposed. In busy metropolit~n courts, where
dockets are overcrowded and delay already is intolerable, trial
judges are likely to dispense with the option of imprisonment
rather than further delay proceedings to secure counsel for an
indigent defendant. In rural counties and small towns, remote from metropolita.n bars and ofte11 strapped for funds,
coullsel may be wholly unavailable or else beyond the financial
means of the local government. As a result, in many cases
in which due process would not require assistance of counsel,
the trial judge will be pressured nonetheless to foreclose the
option of a sentence of imprisonment. 2
Quite apart from the irrationalities and distortions introduced into the sentencing decisions of state trial judges, the
Court's rule has a serious impact on another important public
·· interest. It is not unrea.sonab1e to suppose tha.t the deter-

··'

2 See National Legal Aid and Defender Assn,, The Other Fa.ce of
· Justice 38-40, 63-6i4 (197.:3') ; Arg;ersing,ier, su7m1., at 5-5,...51 (POWELL, J.,
C(l)JlCtu,tin_g:) .

'
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rent effect of the misdemeanor and petty offense laws is
weakened by a systematic reduction in the number of jail
sentences imposed. The Court's rule will also make the enforcement of fines against recalcitrant defendants difficult, if
not impossible, as it seems unlikely that the Court contemplates the circumvention of its rule by the jailing of uncounseled indigents for failure to pay such fines. Id., at 55
(POWELL, J., concurring).
In sum, the Aryersinger line often will result in unfairness
to defendants, and in many other situations seems likely to
disserve the public interest in a rational and effective system
of criminal justice. These flaws are but indications of the
lack of any constitutional basis for the Court's categorical rule.
In my view, the very concept of fairness as a due process doctrine applicable to each trial precludes such inflexible linedrawing. Rather, in each case the trial judge should decide
whether fairness requires appointment of counsel after considering the complexity of the offense charged, the severity of
the sentence that might follow conviction, and other factors
peculiar to each case. In my opinion in Argersinger, I reviewed this inquiry, and the demands that it would place on
state trial judges. Id., at 64-65 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Whether or not the trial court pursued this inquiry on the
record. the appella.te courts reviewing the conviction of an
uncounseled indigent must determine whether the failure to
provide counsel denied the defendant a fair trial. Here, the
petitioner waived a jury trial on a simple charge of shoplifting
several items valued at $13.68. T'he prosecutor made no
opening or closing statement, did not object to any testimony
offered by the petitioner, declined the court's invitation to
cross-examine the petitioner, and called no rebuttal witnesses.
The trial court, in contrast, took an active role in questioning
the petitioner about the facts surrounding his arrest. In sum,
it does not appear that there was any unfairness in trying the
petitioner without affording him the assistance of counsel
Accordingly, 1 Join in the judgment affirming his conviction.
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Mn. Jus'rIGE POWELL, co11curring.
For the reasons stated in my opinion iu Aryers'inyer v,
Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25. 44 (1972). 1 do not thi11 k the rule
adopted by the Court in that case is required by the C'onsti~
tution. Moreover, the drawing of a linC' based on whethei'
there is imprisonment (even for overnight) call have the
practical effect of precluding provision of counsel in other
types of cases iii which conviction can have more serious
consequences. The Aryersin(Jer rule also tends to impair the
proper f unctionillg of the criminal justice system in that t rial
judges, in advance of hearing any evidence and before knowing anything about the case except the charge . all too often
will be compelled to forego the legislatively granted option to
impose a sentence of imprisonment upon co nviction. Preserving this option by providing counsel of te11 will be in'.lpossible or impracticable-particularly in congested urban courts
wlwre scores of cases are heard in a single sitting. and in small
and rura.l communities where lawyers may not be available.
Despite my continuiHg reservations about the Argersinger
rule. it was approved by the Court in the 1972 opinion and
four Justices havP reaffirmed it today. It is important that
this Court provide clear guidance to the hundreds of courts
across tlw country that confront this problem daily. Accordingly. a11d mimlful of stare decisis, l join the opinion of the
Court. 1 do so, however, with the hope that iu due time a
majority will recognize that a rnorP flexible rule is co11siste11 t
with du(' process and will better serve the cause of justice.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUST I CE HARRY A . BLACKMUN
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V

Re:

No. 77-1177

-

Scott v.

Illinois

Dear Bill:
My short dissent in this case, I suspect, speaks for
itself.
I dislike to do this to you and to deprive you of a 11 court.
You have, however, five votes for _the judgment. I found this
case tantalizing. The solution I propose reconciles, I think,
the respective conclusions that have been reached in the right
to counsel and right to a jury trial cases. I must confess, of
course , that neither side urged this rn.iddle ground . Each
wanted his own way all the wa y.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

11

,·

Fehruarv 22, 1Q79

17-1177

Scott v. Illinois

Dear Pott~r.:
In view of our diqcussio~s, an~ those that took
place at last Fridav's Conferenc~, I ~rn consid~rinq
concurrinq in Bill Rehnquist's ooinion for the ourposP of
making a Court.
I woula accompany this with a brief concurrinq
statement along the lines set forth in the enclosed draft.
What ~o you think?
Sincerelv,

Mr. JusticP Stewart
lfp/ss
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